Constiutional Law—First Amendment: The Public\u27s Right of Access to the Broadcast Media for the Airing of Editorial Advertisements by unknown
Valparaiso University Law Review 
Volume 8 
Number 1 Fall 1973 pp.125-139 
Fall 1973 
Constiutional Law—First Amendment: The Public's Right of 
Access to the Broadcast Media for the Airing of Editorial 
Advertisements 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Constiutional Law—First Amendment: The Public's Right of Access to the Broadcast Media for the Airing 
of Editorial Advertisements, 8 Val. U. L. Rev. 125 (1973). 
Available at: https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol8/iss1/6 
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access 
by the Valparaiso University Law School at ValpoScholar. 
It has been accepted for inclusion in Valparaiso 
University Law Review by an authorized administrator of 
ValpoScholar. For more information, please contact a 
ValpoScholar staff member at scholar@valpo.edu. 
CASE COMMENTS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FIRST AMENDMENT: The Public's Right of
Access to the Broadcast Media for the Airing of Editorial
Advertisements
INTRODUCTION
Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National
Committee' had its origin in a hearing before the Federal Communi-
cations Commission (FCC).' In January of 1970, the Business Exec-
utives' Move for Vietnam Peace (BEM) filed a complaint with the
FCC alleging that a Washington, D.C. radio station, WTOP, had
refused to sell the organization broadcast time for the airing of a
series of one-minute spot announcements urging "immediate with-
drawal of American forces from Vietnam and from other overseas
installations."3 WTOP explained that it was a common policy of
broadcasters to bar all editorial advertisements expounding views
on controversial issues, and that since the station presented full and
fair coverage of important public issues it was justified in refusing
acceptance of editorial advertisements.4
A few months later, the Democratic National Committee
(DNC) filed a request with the FCC for a declaratory ruling that a
broadcaster may not as a general policy refuse to sell air time to
responsible organizations for comment on public issues on the
grounds that there is a limited constitutional right of access to the
air waves.5 The Commission considered the two cases together and
rejected the arguments of BEM and DNC, holding that it was per-
missible for broadcasters to impose a ban on all editorial advertise-
ments. The Commission argued that present statutory regulations
already insure adequate coverage of controversial issues, and that a
right of access would entail insoluble administrative problems.6
On appeal, a majority of the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia reversed,7 saying that "a flat ban on paid public issue
1. 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
2. Business Executives' Move for Vietnam Peace, 25 F.C.C.2d 242 (1970).
3. Id. at 243.
4. Id. at 247.
5. Democratic Nat'l Committee, 25 F.C.C.2d 216 (1970).
6. 25 F.C.C.2d at 242.
7. Business Executives' Move for Vietnam Peace v. F.C.C., 450 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir.
1971).
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announcements is in violation of the First Amendment, at least
when other sorts of paid announcements are accepted."' Recogniz-
ing that this was a new effort by members of the public to assert
their first amendment rights in the operation of radio and television,
the court concluded that the broadcasters' retention of total initia-
tive and editorial control would be inimical to free speech protec-
tions, even in light of present statutory regulations on broadcasters.
On appeal to the Supreme Court,9 the court of appeals was
reversed: held, first amendment principles do not require broadcas-
ters to accept editorial advertisements, and the FCC's ruling that
the challenged ban need not be lifted was upheld. The majority
opinion, delivered by Mr. Chief Justice Burger, examined the his-
tory of federal regulation of the broadcast media and underlying
first amendment protections and concluded that neither assures the
public a right of access for the airing of editorial advertisements
during commercial broadcast time.° Mr. Justice Brennan, joined by
Mr. Justice Marshall, filed a dissent basically reiterating the argu-
ment of the appeals court that the exclusionary policy of the broad-
casters impinges upon the fundamental right of the public to engage
in and to hear vigorous public debate on the broadcast media."
The issue in this case quite clearly is whether a broadcaster can
flatly refuse time for brief non-commercial editorial advertisements
involving controversial issues. The proponents of the right of access
for these "advertorials" (as one writer dubs them),' 2 must affirma-
tively argue two points: (1) that the broadcasters' challenged ban
constitutes sufficient "governmental action" to trigger the applica-
tion of the first amendment; and (2) that the "free speech" portion
of the first amendment assures a right of access for advertorials. The
CBS Court met the two arguments head on and summarily rejected
them both.
A comprehensive discussion of the merits and shortcomings of
the above two arguments is beyond the scope of this comment and
can be found elsewhere.13 These arguments will be treated, however,
8. Id. at 646.
9. 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
10. Id. at 103-32.
11. Id. at 170-204.
12. Note, 85 HARV. L. REv. 689, 692 (1972).
13. For an excellent argument in favor of the right of access and a complete treatment
of the governmental action and first amendment issues see Johnson & Westen, A Twentieth
[Vol. 8Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 8, No. 1 [1973], Art. 6
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to the limited extent of asking whether the CBS decision effectively
disposes of these arguments in a persuasive and conclusive manner.
This comment will attempt to show that the decision is deficient in
that respect, and perhaps fundamentally so in that Chief Justice
Burger decided both issues, when a disposition of only one was
necessary. This comment will also suggest a solution to some of the
problems envisioned by the CBS Court in implementing a right of
access. But before turning to the decision and opinions as such, a
bit of groundwork must be laid.
THE FAIRNESS DOCTRINE AND RED LION
The principle case was decided in the wake of the FCC's formu-
lation of the so-called "fairness doctrine" and the subsequent Su-
preme Court decision in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC. 4 The
fairness doctrine evolved gradually over the years during the devel-
opment of federal regulation of the broadcast media. 5 Basically, the
doctrine can be shortened to two requirements or obligations upon
broadcast licensees: 6 (1) coverage of issues of public importance
must be adequate; and (2) such coverage must fairly reflect diver-
gent views. 7 Moreover, this coverage must be provided at the broad-
caster's own expense if necessary," and if other sources are unavail-
able, the duty must be met by providing programming at the licen-
see's own initiative. 9
In Red Lion the Court gave judicial approval to the FCC's
Century Soapbox: The Right to Purchase Radio and Television Time, 57 VA. L. REV. 547
(1971). Contra, Jaffe, The Editorial Responsibility of the Broadcaster: Reflections on Fairness
and Access, 85 HARv. L. REV. 768 (1972). Jaffe argues that the proponents of the right of access
entertain an hysterical overestimation of the media, and that in fact the total influence of
broadcasting on political attitudes is "at best marginal." He writes that to hold broadcasters
subject to constitutional restraints would be stretching the concept of state action much too
far, for by merely tolerating challenged conduct the state does not adopt it as its own. See
also Canby, The First Amendment Right to Persuade: Access to Radio and Television, 19
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 723 (1972); Mallamund, The Broadcast Licensee as Fiduciary: Toward the
Enforcement of Discretion, 1973 DUKE L.J. 89.
14. 395 U.S. 367 (1965).
15. For a summary of the history of the fairness doctrine see id. at 375-86.
16. Congress gave statutory approval to the fairness doctrine by amending § 315 of the
Communications Act of 1937. Act of September 14, 1959, § 1, 73 Stat. 557, as amended, 47
U.S.C. § 315(a) (1972).
17. See generally Applicability of the Fairness Doctrine in the Handling of Controver-
sial Issues of Public Importance, 29 FED. REG. 10415 (1964).
18. Cullman Broadcasting Co., 25 P & F RADfo REG. 895 (1963).
19. John J. Dempsey, 6 P & F RADIO REG. 615 (1950).
et al.: Constiutional Law—First Amendment: The Public's Right of Access t
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1973
128 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
expansion of the fairness doctrine-the "personal attack" and "pol-
itical editorializing" rules.20 The broadcasters alleged that such re-
quirements imposed upon their rights of free speech, but the Su-
preme Court justified such interference by invoking the constitu-
tional rights of the public which, it said, are at the foundation of
the fairness doctrine rules.' The Court reasoned that the free speech
rights of the broadcast licensees did not include a right to "snuff
out" the free speech rights of the public. In fact, said the Court: "It
is the right of the viewers and listeners, and not the rights of the
broadcasters, which is paramount." 2 It should be noted here, how-
ever, that although the appeals court and the Supreme Court in
CBS referred frequently to Red Lion, the issue raised by BEM and
DNC is not completely analogous to the issue in Red Lion. Specifi-
cally, the right of access is somewhat different from the fairness
doctrine. The "fairness" requirement is satisfied when the licensee
airs programs reflecting a view in opposition to one previously aired,
and the control of the program format along with the selection of
the opposition speakers is retained by the broadcaster. The contro-
versy reflected in CBS is whether the public has an initial right of
access to purchase radio and television time for the airing of contro-
versial issues.
THE CHALLENGED BAN-GOVERNMENTAL AcTION?
As pointed out above, in order for the appellees DNC and BEM
to argue they are assured a right of access it must be shown that the
challenged ban constitutes sufficient "governmental action" to acti-
vate the application of the first amendment. That "Congress shall
make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press"
is a prohibition of governmental action-not of activity of private
persons. The court of appeals argued that the reach of the first
amendment should not be dependent upon such technical distinc-
20. The editorial reply and personal attack rules appear at 47 C.F.R. § § 73.123, 73.300,
73.598, 73.679 (1972). The "political editorializing" rule provides that when a broadcaster
endorses a political candidate in an editorial, he must give other candidates or their spokes-
men an opportunity to respond. Similarly, the "personal attack" rule provides that if during
a presentation of a view on a controversial issue of public importance the honesty, integrity
or character of a person is attacked, the licensee must notify the person attacked and give
him an opportunity for rebuttal.
21. 395 U.S. at 391.
22. Id. at 390.
[Vol. 8
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 8, No. 1 [1973], Art. 6
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol8/iss1/6
POLITICAL ADVERTISEMENTS
tions as "public" or "private," but rather should be judged by
"functional considerations. '2 3 Such considerations, they argued,
show that the broadcast industry is intimately related with the
federal government with the result that there is "joint participa-
tion" and "interdependence.''24
The Supreme Court disagreed. There is not a symbiotic rela-
tionship, Chief Justice Burger contended, because the legislative
history of governmental regulation of the broadcast media clearly
shows that the licensee is merely a "public trustee" and the govern-
ment's role is only that of an "overseer."25 Since the activity of the
licensees and the regulation of the media by the federal government
are clearly distinguishable, the broadcasters' ban on advertorials is
not governmental action."
Thus, it cannot be said that the Government is a "partner"
to the action of broadcast licensee complained of here, nor
is it engaged in a "symbiotic relationship" with the licen-
see, profiting from the invidious discrimination of its proxy.
The First Amendment does not reach acts of private parties
in every instance where Congress or the Commission has
merely permitted or failed to prohibit such acts."
Chief Justice Burger's argument here is not very lucid. His
claim that the government is merely an "overseer" rather than a
"partner" seems to be a rather fine distinction that is not too helpful
in resolving the basic issue. The disagreement with the court of
appeals' interpretation of the legislative history of the regulation of
the media never goes further than tagging names on both the gov-
ernment's and licensee's roles. The battle appears to be one of ter-
minology only, with the conclusion that the licensees are "private
parties" free from first amendment constraints merely because that
is what they ought to be called. The reader is left with the impres-
sion that the discussion should have been expanded beyond the
scope of name-tagging and vague legislative interpretation.
But the CBS Court also faced the question of specific
governmental involvement in that the Commission had previously
23. 450 F.2d at 642.
24. Id.
25. 412 U.S. at 117.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 119.
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considered the challenged ban and had refused to invalidate it, and
by doing so, became de facto involved. The court of appeals held
that mere governmental approval of or acquiescence in the licen-
see's challenged activity (via the FCC) constituted governmental
action.2" Burger refuted this position noting that the "Commission
has not fostered the licensee policy here; it has simply declined to
command particular action. . . ." Again the impression given is
that the Chief Justice attempted to dodge the real argument. The
issue is not whether the FCC has "fostered" the challenged ban on
airing advertorials, but whether its policy of permitting it and giving
it federal approval has the effect of sufficiently coloring the activity
as governmental action.
In Public Utilities Commission of the District of Columbia v.
Pollak,'2 the Supreme Court held that a private bus company was
subject to first amendment constraints. 0 Sufficient governmental
action was found in that the Public Utilities Commission had exam-
ined and permitted the challenged refusal of the bus company to
install radio receivers in its public buses.' Seemingly, the Pollak
case established the doctrine that a federal regulatory agency's ac-
quiesnce in challenged action by a private organization constitutes
the requisite action to apply the protections of the first amendment.
The CBS Court avoided this principle by attempting to distinguish
Pollak on the grounds that Pollak was concerned with a transporta-
tion utility that itself derives no protection from the first amend-
ment, whereas the broadcast media enjoys such protection in the
form of journalistic independence 2
Were we to read the First Amendment to spell out
governmental action in the circumstances presented here,
few licensee decisions on the content of broadcasts or the
processes of editorial evaluation would escape constitu-
tional scrutiny.
[The] concept of journalistic independence could not
co-exist with a reading of the challenged conduct of the
licensee as governmental action.Y
28. 450 F.2d at 652-54.
29. 343 U.S. 451 (1952).
30. Id. at 462-63.
31. Id. at 462.
32. 412 U.S. at 120.
33. Id.
[Vol. 8Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 8, No. 1 [1973], Art. 6
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This reasoning is anomalous for several reasons. First, the ra-
tionale for distinguishing Pollak is unclear, for it would seem to be
more proper to apply the acquiescence principle of governmental
action to the broadcast media than to a transportation utility for the
very reason that the Court said it should not. That is, it would be
less desirable to apply first amendment constraints to a bus com-
pany which itself derives no first amendment protections or recipro-
cal rights, than to the broadcast media which has its own "free
press" interests to act as a buffer against the rights of the public.
The transportation utility in Pollak is much more vulnerable to the
sometimes rigid limitations that the first amendment imposes on
the government than would be the broadcasters who could "recipro-
cate" with their own protected constitutional interests. In the latter
situation an acceptable balance could be achieved, for there is no
reason why a finding of governmental action to assure the free
speech rights of the public would necessarily entail a complete dis-
solution of the journalistic independence of the broadcasters. It cer-
tainly puts the two in conflict in an area such as the right of access
to commercial time, but it does not logically follow that the two
cannot "co-exist." In fact, as pointed out above, Red Lion firmly
asserted that the rights of the public, and not those of the broadcast-
ers, are "paramount."
Second, there are other cases in addition to Pollak that the CBS
Court did not consider in this context which also rely on the princi-
ple of acquiscence in finding requisite governmental action.34 In
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority,31 the Court found "state
action" in a private lessee's refusal to serve Blacks on premises
leased from the state. The Court found the necessary connection
between the private discriminatory conduct and the constraints of
the Constitution by holding that because the State Parking Author-
ity had failed to take affirmative steps to prohibit the discrimina-
tion, there existed sufficient state action.
But no State may effectively abidicate its responsibilities
by either ignoring them or by failing to discharge them
whatever the motive. . . . By its inaction, the Authority,
and through it the State, has not only made itself a party
34. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 395 U.S. 715 (1961); Marsh v. Alabama,
326 U.S. 501 (1949).
35. 395 U,S. 715 (1961).
1973]
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to the refusal of service, but has elected to place its power,
property, and prestige behind the admitted discrimina-
tion."
It has long been held that the airwaves are a "limited and valuable
part of the public domain" leased out temporarily by the federal
government which maintains ultimate control over them,37 and thus
there is a close analogy between Burton and the Commission's inac-
tion here. Therefore, the CBS Court's rationale that the Commis-
sion is uninvolved is not at all convincing in light of the "acquiesc-
ence principle" set out in Pollak and Burton.
Third, there are presently many restrictions on the broadcast-
ers embodied in the fairness doctrine, specifically the editorial reply
and personal attack rules upheld in Red Lion." These rules already
are a form of right of access-the broadcaster must give access to a
person opposing a view previously aired. In light of this it is difficult
to see why a holding here that there is sufficient governmental ac-
tion to trigger the application of the first amendment to assure an
initial right of access would now suddenly ring the death knell for
the concept of journalistic independence. Admittedly, the fairness
doctrine is a statutory regulation rather than a bare constitutional
imposition, but that distinction is somewhat illusory since Red Lion
pointed out that there are specific constitutional rights of the public
which underlie and support the fairness doctrine rules. 9 The Court
in Red Lion stated that "the people as a whole retain their . . .
collective right to have the medium function consistently with the
ends and purposes of the First Amendment."4 The contrast be-
tween statutory and constitutional restrictions has become blurred,
and one wonders whether such a distinction is all that important in
this context. Thus, in view of the fact that there are already many
statutory-constitutional restrictions upon the broadcasters, it is un-
likely that a holding that the challenged ban is within the perview
of the first amendment would suddenly signify the apocalypse for
journalistic discretion and independence. Moreover, in a primary
respect the issue here is very narrow. The appellees sought only a
36. Id. at 725.
37. Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. F.C.C., 359 F.2d 994,
1003 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
38. See note 20 supra.
39. See note 21 supra and accompanying text.
40. 395 U.S. at 390.
(Vol. 8
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ruling that the flat ban be deemed impermissible-not that all their
advertorials be accepted and aired. It should also be pointed out
that only commercial air time is at stake, and by far the greater
portion of broadcast time would escape unmolested by such a rul-
ing.
THE CHALLENGED BAN-DISCRIMINATION WITHIN A FORUM?
Having decided that the licensee's refusal and the Commis-
sion's subsequent acquiescence did not constitute governmental
action, Chief Justice Burger then faced the second issue of
"whether, assuming governmental action, broadcasters are required
to [accept advertorials] by reason of the First Amendment."4' The
court of appeals stressed that acceptance of "commercials" and
rejection of editorial advertisements is favoritism toward bland
commercialism, and that such favoritism "flies in the face of the
First Amendment, whose central purpose is to protect and promote
controversy, 'uninhibited, robust, and wide-open,' on public is-
sues."42 The appeals court cited numerous cases which it said estab-
lished the principle that discrimination within a forum is impermis-
sible.4 3 Once a forum has been opened up for commercial advertis-
ing, a ban on controversial editorial advertisements is unconstitu-
tional. Also analogized were several Supreme Court cases which
held that states may not ban certain protected speech while at the
same time permitting other speech in public areas." This reasoning
was rejected by the CBS Court:
In none of those cases did the forum sought for expression
have affirmative and independent statutory obligations
[viz., the fairness doctrine]. . . . In short, there is no "dis-
crimination" present in this case. The question here is not
41. 412 U.S. at 121.
42. 450 F.2d at 661.
43. Id. at 659-61. The BEM court cited numerous federal and state supreme court
decisions which held that once a forum subject to first amendment constraints has been
opened up for commercial (noncontroversial) advertising, a ban on controversial editorial
advertising is unconstitutional. Access was granted to state-supported newspaper, Lee v.
Board of Regents of State Colleges, 306 F. Supp. 1097 (W.D. Wis. 1969) afi'd, 441 F.2d 1257
(7th Cir. 1971); Zucker v. Panitz, 299 F. Supp. 102 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), and to display panels
on public transportation vehicles, Hillside Community Church, Inc. v. City of Tacoma, 76
Wash. 2d 63, 455 P.2d 350 (1969); Wirta v. Alameda-Contra Costa Transit Dist., 68 Cal. 2d
51, 434 P.2d 982, 64 Cal. Rptr. 430 (1967).
44. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965); Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67 (1953);
Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951).
19731
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whether there is to be discussion of controversial issues
but rather who shall determine what issues are to be dis-
cussed by whom, and when. 5
But this attempt to distinguish the broadcast forum on the
basis that this media already has "fairness" obligations is trouble-
some in that it leaves the serious question of whether the fairness
doctrine is realistically effective in assuring the public's right to
hear debate on controversial issues. Chief Justice Burger answered
that question in the affirmative, but such a disposition of the "dis-
crimination" issue places an unwarranted faith in the efficacy of the
fairness doctrine. First, as Mr. Justice Brennan pointed out in his
dissent, the broadcasters have wide discretion in carrying out their
obligations." They are required only to act "reasonably and in good
faith" to determine what issues are to be discussed, which spokes-
man should be used with what format, and how much time should
be allocated. Hence, the licensees still have virtually complete con-
trol, and it is hard to see how these loose requirements will result
in the "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open" debate which the first
amendment assures the public. Vigorous free expression character-
ized by a direct collision of issues is promoted only when individuals
involved have at least some opportunity to take the initiative and
some editorial control in their own hands.
Moreover, as one writer points out,47 the fairness doctrine over-
estimates the broadcaster's willingness to initiate debate or discus-
sion on controversial issues. His primary goal is to "sell" prod-
ucts-the soaps, beers, and perfumes-and a viewer who is angered
by a certain controversial view is simply not a good customer. Thus,
it serves the broadcaster's own financial interests to be as uncon-
troversial as possible, and "robust and wide-open" debate is ig-
nored. In its place is the bland and edited treatment of some se-
lected topic which the broadcaster himself chooses. Chief Justice
Burger pointed out that the fairness doctrine was effective because
a broadcaster who neglects his obligations "does so at the risk of
losing his license."48 This sanction is somewhat misleading as a
practical matter, however, because the precise scope of adequate
45. 412 U.S. at 130.
46. Id. at 187.
47. Jaffe, supra note 13, at 773 n.26.
48. 412 U.S. at 131.
[Vol. 8Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 8, No. 1 [1973], Art. 6
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and fair coverage has escaped definition in the past, and a surpris-
ingly small number of broadcasters have ever had licenses revoked
for this reason.49 In fact, the majority opinion did not cite any in-
stances in which this did occur. In conclusion, then, the majority's
reliance on the fairness doctrine as a viable substitute for the right
of access, supposedly assuring the public's free speech rights in the
broadcast media, appears to be rooted in an unrealistic faith in the
efficacy of that doctrine and the FCC's power (or willingness) to
enforce it.
THE RIGHT OF AccEss-A BALANCING APPROACH
Mr. Chief Justice Burger's main difficulty with the right of
access was that it would entail insurmountable administrative prob-
lems which would outweigh any benefits derived from such a right.5
Burger felt that the FCC's fear that the financially affluent would
monopolize the alloted time was justified, for the purchasing power
of the rich could render meaningless the right of access of the poor
who would be unable to purchase time.5' In addition, claimed
Burger, the fairness doctrine itself would be jeopardized if it was
applied to advertorials, because the "broadcaster might be forced
to make regular programming time available to those holding a view
different from that expressed in an editorial advertisement .... ,,52
Although Burger's and the Commission's fears can be appre-
ciated in this context, a disposition on these pragmatic grounds
prostitutes the more fundamental doctrinal issue at stake. For ex-
ample, one would be shocked if the Supreme Court refused to order
desegregation on the grounds that it would involve certain practical
difficulties in implementation. In other words, the basic doctrinal
issue here-whether the first amendment assures a right of ac-
cess-supercedes and overshadows the possible problems in carry-
ing it out. Also, Chief Justice Burger's apprehensions are actually
49. Two FCC Commissioners, Kenneth A. Cox and Nicholas Johnson, conducted an
extensive study to evaluate the condition of American radio and television. Cox & Johnson,
Broadcasting in America and the F.C.C.'s License Renewal Process: An Oklahoma Case
Study, 14 F.C.C.2d 1 (1968). The results of the study were, in their own words, extremely
disquieting. The Commissioners concluded that the license renewal process is presently a
ritualistic sham, which has no real point. The Commission staff routinely grants all the
renewal applications except for the few whose draftsmen were inexperienced and hence made
technical mistakes in filling them out. Thus most programming obligations are never sub-
jected to scrutiny, and the license revocation sanction is only an ignored formality.
50. 412 U.S. at 124.
51. Id. at 122-27.
52. Id. at 124.
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only speculative, for as Mr. Justice Brennan pointed out in his
dissent in CBS:
We simply have no sure way of knowing whether, and to
what extent, if any, these potential difficulties will actually
materialize. The [majority's] bare assumption that these
hypothetical problems are both inevitable and insurmount-
able indicates an utter lack of confidence in the ability of
the . . . licensees to adjust to changing conditions of a dy-
namic medium.53
Numerous writers in support of the right of access have already
proposed realistic solutions to the supposed difficulties that the
FCC anticipated.54 This writer submits that perhaps there is yet
another answer or solution to the "insurmountable" administrative
problems envisioned by Chief Justice Burger and the Commission.
Very generally, this scheme would require the potential purchasers
of commercial time for the airing of advertorials to come to the
broadcasters "two by two"-similar to the mandate given to ancient
Noah for the filling of the Ark. Suppose, for example, an organiza-
tion wished to purchase commercial time to speak out against recent
liberal abortion standards. Under this new scheme the broadcaster
could deny the organization commercial time if it alone sought time
to editorialize on the controversial topic. But the organization could
acquire a right of access if it found persons or an organization willing
to purchase a corresponding amount of time in opposition. Thus, the
representatives of both views could accompany each other in pres-
enting a request for the purchase of time.
53. Id. at 202.
54. See Canby, supra note 13, at 754-57. Professor Canby suggests that advertising time
could be divided into two categories. One portion or category could be allocated with priority
for views which have not had access. Rates for this block of time could be adjusted to fit the
fiscal ability of the advertisers. A second category should also be available to established
groups with financial backing. The time alloted could be substantial and at the present
commercial rates. Although this system favors well-financed causes, he argues that a bad
system is better than one without a right of access. See also Malone, Broadcasting, the
Reluctant Dragon: Will the First Amendment Right of Access End Suppressing of Controver-
sial Ideas?, 5 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 193, 252-69 (1972); Note, HARv. L. REv. 689, 693-99 (1972).
The last article cited above points out that the present commercial advertising market system
would inevitably discriminate against the poor. The writer suggests that the system be ad-
justed to allow editorial advertisers with insufficient funds to purchase time at below-market
rates. The scheme would require the FCC and the licensees to create a sub-market rate
available to groups or persons whose potential resources were below a stated minimum. The
rate would be set by striking some compromise between the goal of access to the media and
the need to deter frivolous use.
[Vol. 8Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 8, No. 1 [1973], Art. 6
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The above "by two's" scheme would eliminate the dangers and
problems enumerated in the CBS decision. The fairness doctrine
would no longer be jeopardized, since its application would in large
part be obviated by requiring the purchasers to come in pairs, repre-
senting both sides of a controversial issue. The danger of financial
disaster of the broadcasters would also evaporate under this scheme
for the same reason. Furthermore, this approach would reduce the
danger that the views of the affluent or one political party might
dominate, since the persons seeking initial access would be required
to solicit their own opposition and perhaps even pay for some or all
of the corresponding time if the opposition were unable to raise
sufficient funds. This might lead to the problem of an organization
buying up shoddy opposition, but perhaps this could be avoided by
demanding that the parties act in "good faith," a requirement that
is presently placed upon the broadcasters. Admittedly, this proposal
does not contemplate an "absolute" right of access and it may foster
other difficulties, but it illustrates that the number of possible solu-
tions is limited only by the Commission's ingenuity.
THE CONCURRING OPINIONS-SOME DIFFICULTIES
Concurring opinions were filed by Justices Douglas,55 Stewart,56
White,57 and Blackmun (joined by Powell)." Justice Douglas filed a
maverick opinion arguing that the broadcast media should be
treated no differently than newspapers and that the licensees should
have complete discretion.59 There should be no law that abridges the
freedom of the press, and thus even the "Fairness Doctrine has no
place in our First Amendment regime."60 He disparaged the major-
ity opinion for endorsing the fairness doctrine, claiming it "sanc-
tions a federal saddle on broadcast licensees.""1 Douglas' opinion
goes much further than the majority wanted to go, and if the fair-
ness doctrine "has no place" in the first amendment realm then
Burger's majority opinion is stripped of its fundamental rationale
for leaving the ban unmolested.
The concurring opinions of Justices White, Blackmun and Pow-
55. 412 U.S. at 148.
56. Id. at 132.
57. Id. at 146.
58. Id. at 147.
59. Id. at 150.
60. Id. at 154.
61. Id. at 163.
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ell, which concur in part, bring to light a more serious difficulty. As
outlined above, Chief Justice Burger initially decided in his major-
ity opinion that there was insufficient governmental action, and
then proceded to the merits, holding that the ban did not violate
the substance of the first amendment. He was joined in the govern-
mental action determination by only two others, Justices Stewart
and Rehnquist. Justice White stated in his concurring opinion that
he was "not ready" to decide the governmental action issue,6" and
Justices Blackmun and Powell indicated that the "governmental
action issue does not affect the outcome of the case,"63 and hence
they did not concur in this part of Burger's opinion. Thus, it cannot
be said that the CBS case is a holding that there is insufficient
governmental action in the maintenance of the ban. Furthermore,
since the Chief Justice (joined only by Rehnquist and Stewart) first
decided on the governmental action issue, it could be argued that
the later treatment of the first amendment right of access issue is
only dicta. The result is a curious situation in which one is hard
pressed to ferret out which issue is in fact determinative. It was
clearly unnecessary for the Chief Justice to decide on both issues,
for a negative disposition of either one would have been conclusive.
CONCLUSION
Taken as a whole, the CBS decision is disconcerting, especially
because the legal implications of the case are unclear. Only three
of the nine Justices decided that there was not governmental action,
and hence the precedential value of that part of the decision is
questionable. The decision is also not at all helpful in the area of
discrimination within a public forum, because the majority opinion
avoided that issue, looking instead to the fact that the broadcasters
have statutory "fairness" obligations already. The Court also relied
heavily on the belief that implementation of a right of access would
entail countless administrative obstacles. But this comment has
attempted to show that those fears are largely unfounded, and that
perhaps a novel approach to implementing access would evaporate
those supposed difficulties.
The CBS decision is troublesome when one considers that radio
and television are now the primary source and forum for public news
and debate. If the public is refused a limited right to purchase time
62. Id. at 146.
63. Id. at 148.
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to voice its views, then it is true that the public's free speech inter-
ests are diminishing as the age of technology and mass communica-
tion moves onward. The era of the town meeting and street corner
debates is forever gone, and in its place is television and radio,
present in over sixty million homes across the nation.64 And if mem-
bers of the public are to be denied access to this vital outlet for
speech, then the future of open debate on controversial issues is
indeed bleak.
64. 25 F.C.C.2d at 235.
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